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1Abstract
In a context  of a serious financial and legal crisis, Argentina reformed its Pension
System in  1994, when a multipillar model with a funded scheme was introduced  and first
pillar  parameters,  as minimum  age and vesting requirements were tightened.  The  new
system has a significant first pillar (which offers a flat benefit currently valued at 28% of
average wage to  all retirees) and a second pillar that should provide a similar amount,  once
the transition  is completed.
The  new system has developed rapidly and  most formal workers have joined the
new funded scheme.  However, there are some problems that must be resolved. In the first
pillar, the reform balanced long term finances, but it will also reduce coverage very rapidly,
as a consequence of the combined effect of low formality in the labor market  and stricter
contribution  requirements.  The  most  serious  problems  in  the  funded  pillar  are  the
administration  costs and  the  need to  improve  regulation  and  supervision  of  insurance
companies, that  provide disability and survivors coverage and annuities to beneficiaries.
While these problems are important,  their consequences can be avoided if adequate
policies are developed by the Government.  In this  sense, the experience of the  pension
reform in Argentina is an excellent lesson for other countries that are considering a reform
in their own systems.
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3The Pension  System in Argentina  six years after the Reform
1.  INTRODUCTION
This  document presents  a description  of the Pension  System in Argentina, assessing  its
performance six years after the major reform that introduced a multipillar scheme.  We
particularly concentrate our attention on those aspects  that are problematic and require
further refinement.
The  Argentine Pension System includes  a national system, the SIJP  (Sistema  Integrado
de Jubilaciones y Pensiones - Integrated System of Retirement and Pensions),  as well as
smaller governmental  provincial systems,  provincial-level  professionalfunds  and some  special
systems  that cover the military and security  forces.
The legal  coverage  of the SIJP  is almost universal,  since it includes  public and private
employees  as well as  self employed. The  provincial systems  cover  government employees  of the
provinces or municipalities that have not yet joined the SIJP (approximately  one half of all
provinces) and  there are a  large number  of professional  funds  -mainly  provincial
employers  funds (for instance, the Bank of the Province of Buenos Aires) and special  systems
(like the Military and  the Federal Police).  Out  of the approximately 13 million  active,
employed workers in  Argentina,  4.7  million  contribute to  the SIJP, around a  million
contribute to provincial regimes and  500,000 to the other schemes. Roughly 6.8 million
workers do not  contribute to any  system (most of them should belong to the SIJP)  and,
therefore,  may not have adequate  retirement  savings.
This analysis is  focused on the SIJP,  because  it is the system with the widest scope  and
it is slowly absorbing the other schemes. Nevertheless,  it is important to mention than the
problems ofprovincial and sectoral  regimes  should be carefully  addressed,  because  they appear
in some cases  to be  financially unsustainable.
The second  section describes  the basic  framework of the new system.  Next, the third
section  presents  information on the evolution of the system  in itsfirstfive  years of operations.
Section  four discusses  the performance  of the new system  and its success  in providing adequate
social insurance coverage. Finally, section  five presents  the main lessons  of tbe Argentinean
experience  with pension reform.
42.  THE  BASIC STRUCTURE  OF  THE SIJP
2.1  The New System
Argentina's  new  pension  system, established in  1994, is made up  of a Public
PAYG  Regime and an Individual Funded Regime.  In this section, we briefly describe
the  operation  of  this  new  system,  including  the  multipillar  scheme, its  coverage,
contribution  rates, benefits, and the  Government  role in the  operation  of SIJP.  The
structure  of the  new system is somewhat complex, and a diagram describing the main
institutions  and characteristics is included at the end of the section.
2.1.1.  The Multipillar  Scheme
The national pension system in Argentina (SIJP) is designed according to a model
known  in the literature  as "multipillar".  The system has three pillars; one, run  by the
government, that is mostly compulsory and offers a basic benefit; the second, run by the
government  and private  managers, is also compulsory and pays benefits in relation to
past  contributions.  The  third  pillar,  of voluntary  participation,  is  run  by  private
managers and is very small.
The first pillar is run as a pay-as-you-go  scheme, by the National  Social Security
Administration  (ANSeS).  It  is  financed by  employers'  contributions  (16% of gross
taxable income, according to the law) and the main benefit from this pillar is a Ulniversal
Basic Benefit (PBU,  a monthly flat amount of approximately 28% of average wages,  that
can be claimed by any worker  with  30 years of contributions  and that  has reached the
minimum  eligibility age.
The second pillar,  financed by employees contributions  (11% of gross taxable
income), consists of two alternative regimes: a pay-as-you-go  regime, managed by ANSeS
and a Funded Regime, managed by privately owned Pension Fund Managing Companies
(AFJP).'  Disability and survivors benefits are financed by the second pillar, depending
on the option  (funded or pay-as-you-go)  the worker has chosen, while survivor benefits
due to death of a retiree are financed in the same way as the retirement payment.
Besides the elements already described, the SIJP has a transitional benefit, aimed at
providing  benefits to  workers that  contributed  to  the  old system.  All workers  with
contributions  before the  reform and  retiring  after 1994 will receive a Compensatory
Benefit (PC), proportional  to the pre-retirement income and the number of years with
1  Assuming  that a worker contributes 35 years in a row, with a commission  of 3.5% of his
salary, a wage increase  of 2%  annually and 5%  annual  earnings,  he will  receive  approximately
30% of his last wage as a pension  for life.
5contributions to the old system. 2 In addition, workers retired before the reform will
continue  to receive  their benefits.
The administration  of the new first pillar, the PAYG second  pillar, the benefits
paid out under the old system and transitional benefits  is concentrated  in one scheme,
called  the "Public  Pension  Regime"  (RPP),  that is managed  by a government  agency,  the
National Administration  of Social  Security  (ANSeS).  Additionally,  the RPP covers  part
of the cost of annuities  for disability  and survivors  benefits  in the funded  regime.
2.1.2. Legal Coverage
Participation in the SIJP is compulsory  for wage  earners in the private sector,
employees  of the National Government and of Provincial  or Municipal  Governments
that have joined the system and for self employed workers.  Some special groups, as
directors and partners of companies,  members of administration  councils,  clergymen,
housewives and others may join the  system on a voluntary basis.  Members of the
military and security  forces  and other small  groups  are excluded.
When workers enter the labor force they are automatically  included  in the first
pillar scheme, and must choose between the PAYG and the funded regimes  for their
earnings related scheme.  If they choose the PAYG, they can switch to the funded
scheme  at any time. If they chose  funded,  they cannot go back to PAYG. The default
option (applied  if the worker does  not make and explicit  choice)  is the funded scheme. 3
2.1.3.  Contributions
Contributions to the SIJP  are compulsory,  and workers  in the funded scheme  can
also  make additional  voluntary  contributions. Employees  and employers  are required  to
contribute 11% and 16%4  of taxable income, respectively. The self-employed  must
contribute 27% of a pre-defined  taxable  income. Voluntary  contributions can be made
by  workers  (called "imposiciones  voluntarias") or  by employers (called "depositos
convenidos"). The law defined  a minimum  taxable  income,  equivalent  to approximately
33%  of average  wages,  and a maximum,  of about 6 times  the average  wage.
Employers' contributions, and  16 of  the  27 percentage points  of  the  self-
employed,  are transferred  to ANSeS  and used  to finance  the RPP. To complement  these
contributions, some  earmarked  taxes  are also directed  to the ANSeS,  and any remaining
deficit  is covered  by the National Treasury.
2  This method for dealing  with the benefits  accrued  in a PAYG  scheme  contrasts  with the
recognition  bond  method  used  in other  countries  such  as  Chile.
3 Workers  in the labor  force  at  the time  of  the reform  were  given  a five  month  period  to choose
which  regime  they  prefer,  the default  option  being  the funded  scheme.
4 As  mentioned  before,  the employers  contribution  rate  can  be reduced  by decree.  Since  1994  a
complex  scheme  of reductions  by location  and industry  is in place,  generating  an actual
contribution  rate  of  approximately  8% as  of  the end  of 1999.
6Employees'  contributions,  and  11 of  the  27 points  of the  self employed,  are
transferred to  ANSeS and used to  finance the RPP  if workers choose that  regime, or
transferred  to  a pension  fund  (after AFJP fees are deducted) if  workers  choose  the
funded regime.  In this case, the AFJPs withdraw  their commissions from the employee
contributions,  resulting in a smaller net contribution  of around 7.5% of taxable income.
If workers do not make an explicit choice, they are assigned  to an AFJP.
2.1.4. Benefits
The  public pension  regime pays separate benefits to  pensioners under  the  old
system, and to affiliates of the new system.  The benefits for the new system are the  (a)
Basic Universal Benefit (PBU); (b) Compensatory  Benefit (PC); (c) Additional  Benefit
for Permanence (PAP); (d) survivorship and disability benefits.  In addition, the funded
regime offers (e) Ordinary  Retirement  (RO); and (f) survivorship and disability benefits
to those who choose this scheme.
(a) Basic Universal Benefit (PBU) is a redistributive, flat benefit.  Retirees of the
SIJP who have contributed to the system (either the new or the old one) for 30
years or more are eligible at 60/65 years old (females/males). The benefit level is
approximately 28% of average wage.
(b) Compensatory  Benefit (PC) is a benefit for individuals who meet the criteria
for the PBU for age and years of contributions  and have contributed to the old
system. They receive 1.5% of pre-retirement income per year of contributions  to
the  old  system.  Thus,  a  worker  with  35  years  of  contributions  retiring
immediately  after the  reform  would  have receive a  PC  of 52.5% of  his/her
previous salary, while young workers entering the labor force after the reform
will not receive any PC.
(c) Additional  Benefit for Permanence (PAP) is a benefit for workers who  meet
the  criteria for the PBU  and decided to  join the second pillar PAYG  scheme.
They  receive 0.85% of pre-retirement  income per year of contributions  to  the
new second pillar PAYG scheme. Thus, a worker with 35 years of contributions
to this  scheme will receive a PAP of 29.75% of his/her  pre-retirement income,
while somebody  who  retired  immediately after the  reform (or who  chose the
funded second pillar regime) will not receive any PAP.
(d) Survivors and  Disability  Benefits are benefits for  survivors of contributing
workers  in  the  second  pillar  PAYG  scheme  (limited to  spouse  and  young
children of active contributors)  or the workers, if they become disabled. Benefits
are pre-defined. Disabled workers receive 70% of their salary before the disability
and survivors receive between 50% and 70%, depending on the family structure.
Benefits are reduced and even denied if compliance has been too low 5.
5 The "regularity"  rule establishes  that only workers  with contributions  in more than 29 of the
last 36 months receive  full benefits,  those with less  than 30 but more that 17 months receive
reduced  benefits  (by 5/7) and those with less  than 18  months receive  no benefits.
7(e) Ordinary  Retirement  (RO) is a benefit received by affiliates of an AFJP once
they retire.  This benefit is paid in addition to any other from the RPP that the
workers have accrued rights, such as PBU and PC.  Benefits are paid in the form
of annuities,  scheduled withdrawals  or  fragmentary withdrawals.  In  the first
case, the  beneficiary buys  an  annuity  from  a  retirement  insurance company
(CSR), and the  balance of the  account  is transferred  to  this  CSR.  Annuity
contracts  are highly  regulated and  only  life annuities  that  include  survivors'
benefits are allowed.  The  basic parameters used to  calculate the benefits (life
tables  and  interest  rates)  are  established  by  the  Supervisory  Agencies.
Alternatively, beneficiaries can leave their balance in the pension fund, and agree
with  the AFJP to  withdraw  a monthly  amount that  cannot  exceed what  they
would  get from  an  annuity.  Every  year  the  agreement is  reconsidered and
amounts  are adjusted, with  a  reduction  unless  returns  were  high  enough  to
compensate for  the  aging process.  At  any  time,  the  beneficiary may use his
balance to  buy  a  regular  annuity.  In  the  event  of  the  death  of the  main
beneficiary, the balance of the account is used to  finance the survivors benefits
(either as an annuity or  a scheduled withdrawal, depending on the desire of the
survivors) and,  if there  are no  beneficiaries, the  balance becomes part  of the
deceased's estate.  The  third  option,  the  scheduled withdrawal,  consists of a
monthly  withdrawal  from  the  individual  account  that  exceeds  what  the
beneficiary would  get from  an  annuity,  but  is less than  50% of the maximum
PBU.
(f) Survivors and  Disability  Benefits are benefits for  survivors of  contributing
workers  in  the  second  pillar  funded  scheme  (limited  to  spouse and  young
children of active contributors) or the workers, if they become disabled. Benefits
are calculated with the same criteria as in the PAYG scheme (including the rules
on regularity), but  the financial arrangement is different.  Once  the right to  a
benefit  is established and  the  monthly  amount  is calculated, the  AFJP  must
calculate how much capital is necessary to  acquire an annuity  that would cover
such  benefit.  Then,  the  AFJP,  drawing  from  the  disability  and  survivors
insurance, must  complement  the  balance of the account to  reach this  amount.
Once the money is deposited, the beneficiaries may choose to buy an annuity or
agree on a scheduled withdrawal, according to their own preferences. During the
transitional years, part of the complementary capital is paid by ANSeS 6
6 The decree  55/94  established  that the National Government  participates  in the constitution  of
the Complementary  Capital  with a sum proportional to the age  of the workers  in 1994.
8Figure  1. Scheme of the Integrated  Pension  System (SIJP)
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Source:  Isuani,  Rofman  and  San  Martino  (1996).
As  a result of the combination  of different  benefits, workers  in  the  earnings-
related  PAYG  scheme  will  receive,  once  they  retire  the  PBU,  PC  and  PAP,  while  those
in  the  funded  regime  will  get  the  PBU,  PC  and  JO.  In  case  of  disability  or  death,
members  of  either  scheme  will  receive  similar  benefits,  although  the  financial
mechanism  used  is different.
9Table 1. Benefits to be received by retiring workers,
as percentage of their average salara.
Case  lesu  es  rAt  II
A worKer  witn  b years Ot  contriDutions  to tne oia system ana a saiary
equal  to...
bu%0 ot average  5/.8%  52.5%  U.0%  0.0%  110A3'/o
average  28.9%  52.5%  0.0%  0.0%  81.4%
200%  average  14.4%  52.5%  0.0%  0.0%  66.9%
A worKer  wlth ZU  years ot contriDutlons  to the oia system, 1 b  years to tne
new system (in the PAYG regime) and a salary equal to...
b0u/o  ot average  5b  7. 6  3U.  U  Yo  12.8YUo  0.Uu/o  1UU  b05
average  28.9%  30.0%  12.8%  0.0%  71.6%
200% average  14.4%  30.0%  12.8%  0.0%  57.2%
A worKer witrl 20 years or contrioutions  to trie  oia system, 1i  years to tne
new system (in the CAPITALIZATION regime)  and a salary equal to...
500  ot average  57.8  '/o  30.0u/o  U.0%/o  11.1%  yB  .u/0
average  28.9%  30.0%  0.0%  11.1%  70.0%
200% average  . 14.4%  30.0%  0.0%  11.1%  55.5%
A  worKer  with ;b  years ot contributions to the new system (in the rAYU
regime)  and a salary equal to...
50u%o  ot average  57.8u/o  0.0%U  29.8%  0.0U/o  871.%
average  28.9%  0.0%  29.8%  0.0%  58.6%
200% average  14.4%  0.0%  29.8%  0.0%  44.2%
A worKer  witn J7 years ot contriDutions  to the new system (in the
CAPITALIZATION regime)  and a salary equal to...
b0%  ot average  T  7.8%  0.0%  0.0%  3b.8%  93.6/
average  28.9%  0.0%  0.0%  35.8%  64.7%
200% average  14.4%  0.0%  0.0%  35.8%  50.2%
Note: Funded  (capitalization)  scheme benefits calculated assuming  a 4% real interest rate, and
1%  real wage growth.  Projected mortality rates are used.
Source: Own calculations.
2.2  The status of the new system
2.2.1. Membership  and Coverage
The main difficulty in determining the coverage level of the new pension system
is related  to  the  need  to define  several concepts.  Coverage  is generally  measured  by  the
proportion  of labor  force that  satisfies requirements to  receive benefits.  Argentina's
labor force is currently close  to 15 million workers.  Not all of them are required to join
the SIJP since, as mentioned before, some specific groups are covered by other programs.
While there  are no  official data on this  issue, it  is estimated that  approximately  1.5
million workers  are in this group, leaving approximately  13.5 million  workers  to  be
covered by the SIJP.
Affiliation  to  the -system  (that  is,  registering  and  obtaining  a  social security
identification  number)  is  a  necessary but  not  sufficient  condition  to  be  covered.
10Moreover, it is possible to be affiliated with the system and not to be in the labor force.
As of December  1999, approximately  10.1 million  workers were affiliated to  the SIJP.
Of  those,  nearly  7.9 million were in  the funded  scheme.  Not  all affiliated workers
contribute  regularly.  In fact, by the end of 1999, only about 4.5 million workers were
contributing,  3.5 million to  the funded  regime and  about one million  to  the  PAYG
regime.  The ratio of contributors to affiliates shows a steady decline over time, and it is
around  45% in  1999.  This rate does not  reflect compliance, since many workers  that
should contribute are not affiliated with the system and some affiliates are not  required
to  contribute.  This  is the  case where  someone  made a few contributions  and  then
withdrew  from  the labor force, but  has not  reached the minimum age for retirement.
Instead, comparing contributors to labor force not  covered by other systems sh Dws that
compliance is around 34% (or 39% if unemployed workers are excluded).
Due to  the requirements of minimum  number  of years with  contributions,  an
affiliate is not  necessarily fully covered against old age risks.  If, for example, a  male
worker aged 63 years with no contribution history decides to join the system, even if he
makes his contributions  he will not receive most benefits, because he will not be able to
complete  the  minimum  30 years  with  contributions.  Likewise, somebody  with  or
without  contributions  in the past, but with  no contributions  in the last 18 months,  is
not  eligible for  survivors  or  disability  benefits  according  to  the  rules.  The  only
exception for  this  is that  in  both  cases, workers  have the  right  to  receive a  benefit
financed  with  whatever  funds  they  have  accumulated  in  their  individual  funded
accounts,  but  they  have  no  rights  to  public  benefits  or  to  disability  or  survivors
coverage.
Figure 2. Labor force, employed labor force,
affiliates  and contributors,  1994-1999
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11While no data are available on compliance as defined by the law, information  on
contributors  (defined as affiliates who actually made their compulsory contribution  in
any specific month)  may give an idea of the situation.  As of June 1999,  the proportion
of actual contributors  to  the estimated number of workers who should contribute  was
around 37%.
Figure 3. Active contributors to SIJP, according to membership in public and private
earnings-related scheme, 1994-1999
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Note: The dark area indicates  the percentage  of contributors  that did not make  the option and
are  waiting  to be assigned  to an AFJP.
Source:  Own, based  on data from AFJP
The sustained  increase  in participation  in the funded pillar was caused by several
factors. First, the law established that workers entering the system must make a choice
between funded and unfunded  schemes.  If no choice is made, they are assigned to the
funded scheme by default.  A significant proportion  of workers entered the system this
way. Nearly  30% of the enrolled  labor force at the  time the system was created was
assigned to an AFJP, and the percentage of new workers that do not express their choice
is now as high as 70%.  A second reason for this trend is that  almost all new workers
that do make a choice prefer the fully funded scheme.  In addition, most workers that
preferred to go into the PAYG scheme were older and consequently, the "replacement"
process tilts the balance towards the funded scheme as time passes.
2.2.2.  Transfers
One  of the  main characteristics of the new funded  scheme is the existence of
competition  between  AFJPs and the possibility for  affiliates to  switch between them.
Argentina's system allows workers to make up to two transfers per calendar year, with  a
minimum of four contrib utions  to the fund they  are leaving.  In five years, there have
been 2.6 million  transfers,  a  figure equivalent to  approximately  about 75% of  total
12contributors  at the end of the period. There have been some significant changes in the
rate of switching funds during this period. After transfers were authorized in early 1995,
the rate began to  increase and reached a maximum during the second semester of 1997,
when approximately  9.5% of all affiliates switched funds. A change in the regulations,
together  with  an implicit  agreement among the largest AFJPs led to a reduction in the
number of transfers.  During the second semester of 1999, only 2.2% of affiliates zhanged
funds.
Figure 4. Percentage of affiliates that switched  fumds  in one semester, 1994-1999
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Source: Grushka & De Biase (1997)  and SAFJP
This  phenomenon  is of particular  interest because, on  one hand, it  shows the
level of satisfaction of affiliates with  the service they receive from managing companies
and, on the other, the effort to  attract affiliates from other AFJP (and to convince their
own to stay) explains a significant part of the companies' operating costs.
A study measuring and analyzing affiliate flows since the beginning of the new
system found that the most important determinant of the number of incoming transfers
is related  to  marketing  policy  of  the  AFJPs.  More  precisely, the  expenditures  on
marketing and the size of the sales force were found to be critical.  On the other hand,
the total commission, that represents the cost of the service offered by AFJP, showed no
significant correlation with transfers. (Grushka and De Biase, 1996).
2.2.3.  Fees and Insurance Costs
Managing companies can only charge fees on affiliates' contributions,  either as a
flat amount  or as a proportion  of taxable income.  The managing companies charge a
commission, and use it to  pay a life and disability insurance policy and all operational
costs of the AFJP.
Fees can take  the  form  of a flat  amount,  payable  every month  when  a  new
contribution  is made, and/or  a percentage of the taxable income payable as a part of the
13contribution.  The combination chosen is determined  by the marketing  strategy of the
AFJPs. Thus, some  companies  have  adopted a niche strategy,  setting  a high flat amount
and a low percentage, attracting high income affiliates.  Others, targeting a wider
market, have preferred to  charge no flat amount and a higher percentage  on taxable
income.
Average  total charges,  including disability  and survivors  insurance  premia,  have
been around 3.4% of taxable income since the system began, with little change  over
time.  In July 1994,  the average  was 3.44% (about 31,12%  of contributions)  and, five
years later, it was 3.41%.  While total  charges did not  change, their composition
experienced  a major transformation:  when the system  first began,  63.6% of commissions
were used to pay insurance  premiums  and the remaining  36.4%  for AFJPs  expenses. By
mid 1999,  the distribution was 27.7%  for insurance  and 72.3%  for the AFJP expenses.
This trend started to  reverse during 1999 and it is expected  that the new insurance
policies,  valid from mid-2000,  will result in a distribution  closer  to 50-50%.
While selections of insurance companies  are made through a bidding process,
most  AFJP  contracts  are  with  an  insurance company related to  them  through
ownership.  Consequently, it is possible that changes  in life and disability  insurance
premiums are more linked to financial  strategies  of the related  financial  entities  than to
changes  in market conditions.
2.2.4. Investment  Restrictions and Performance
Description  of AFIP structure
Pension fund assets are independent  and separated  from AFJPs assets.  The funds
belong to  the members and cannot be seized in case of bankruptcy of the managing
company. The companies  have no property rights over them and the balance  sheet is
completely separate.  Managing companies cannot withdraw money from the funds
except for payment of  benefits or  transfers of  affiliates' balances to  other  funds.
Consequently,  all expenses  related  to managing  the funds must be covered  by the AFJPs,
using  the commissions  they collect  on contributions.
The funds are divided in shares  of equal value and characteristics.  The value of
the shares is calculated  daily, based on the market value of assets. Annual returns are
calculated  monthly on a rolling basis, as the ratio of the average  share value in a given
month to the average  share value twelve months before.  All AFJPs are required to
guarantee  a minimum return equivalent  to the average  for the industry minus 30% or
two percentage points, whichever is smaller.  Symmetrically,  if returns of any fund
exceed  the average  plus 30% or two percentage  points, the share  value has to be reduced
to this maximum level  and the excess  is credited  to a special  account  (that is part of the
pension  fund) that serves  as a profit reserve.
When in any given 12-month  period, a fund's return is below the  minimum
guaranteed,  the AFJP must compensate  the affiliates,  transferring  funds from the profit
reserve  and, if necessary,  from an investment  reserve. If both reserves  are exhausted  and
14compensation  is still due, the State must pay the difference,  take over the administration
of the fund and withdraw the license  of the AFJP.
The investment  reserve  is the property of the AFJP and must be maintained  at all
times.  This reserve  must be $3 million or 2% of the fund, whichever  is larger.  The
reserve  must be invested  and is subject  to the same  investment  restrictions  as the pension
fund.  In short, there is a multi-tier guarantee  system to cover possible  deficiencies  in
returns.  First, a reserve is formed with the own fund resources. As a second level
guarantee, the  AFJP maintains an investment reserve.  Finally, the  State assumes a
residual  guarantee  in case  it becomes  necessary.
Investment  limits
As part of the system of safeguards,  managers  confront a number of limitations
regarding  investment instruments. The limitations  aim to force a minimum amount of
diversification (setting limits by  type of instrument), reduce concentration of risks
(limiting the  percentage that can be invested in  securities issued by one company),
eliminate conflicts of interest (prohibiting investments  in assets issued by companies
related to the AFJP) and reduce overall risk (setting  minimum risk rating levels). All
certificates, stock shares and any  other  physical evidence of  investments must be
maintained under the  control  of  a custodian institution, separate from the  AFJP.
Valuation of all instruments is made daily by the Supervision  of Pension Funds, based
on market value. A special  valuation  method is used for certain  public bonds that will
be kept until maturity in the funds' portfolios, in order to reduce  the volatilitv of the
fund.  The AFJPs may invest the pension fund assets  in the following  categories  listed
below.  There is a maximum limit for each category,  defined as a percentage  of total
assets.
Type  of  Assets  Limit
a. Bonds  Issued  by the National  Government  50,0
a.  1.  Bonds  Issued  by the National  Government,  market  value  50,0
a.2. Bonds  Issued  by the National  Government,  investment  account  30,0
b. Bonds  Issued  by Provincial  and  Local  Governments  15,0
b.  1.  Bonds  Issued  by Provincial  and  Local  Governments,  market  value  15,0
b.2.  Bonds  Issued  by Provincial  and  Local  Governments,  investment  2,0
account
c. Commercial  Papers,  long  term  28,0
d. Commercial  Papers,  short  term  14,0
e. Convertible  Commercial  Papers  28,0
f. Convertible  Commercial  Papers,  issued  by Privatized  Companies  14,0
g. Certificates  of  Deposits  28,0
h. Equity  35,0
i. Recently  Privatized  Companies  Equity  14,0
j. Mutual  Funds  14,0
k. Foreign  Government  Bonds  10,0
1.  Foreign  Comnmercial  Papers  7,0
15m.  Options  and  Futures  2,0
n.  Securities with  Mortgage  Warranty  28,0
fi. Direct  Investment  Funds  10,0
max.
Regional  Econormies  (only Nacio'n  AFJP)  50,0  nmin.
120,0
Source: SAFJP
Performance of the Funds
As  of December  1999, pension  funds had assets valued  at US$16.8 billion, or
about six percent  of GDP.  Accumulated revenue since the start  of the system is US$
18.5 billion, almost totally from compulsory contributions.  Monthly  revenue has been
growing  over time,  as a consequence of  the  growing number  of contributors.  The
average in  the  last  twelve  months  is  US$  360  million.  The  market  is  relatively
concentrated; the largest six funds receive 83% of contributions,  while the six smallest
have less than 5%.  Because  of the wide variation in taxable income, monthly  collection
per contributor  ranges from US$225 to US$67, with an average of about US$100.
Accumulated nominal  annual  returns  for  the  first  six years  of  operation  were
around 13%, in a context of very low inflation.  Annual returns,  measured on a rolling
12-month period, have shown a significant volatility, with a maximum level of 28.8% (in
August 1996-August  1997)  and a minimum of -13.1% (September 1997-September  1998).
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Pension funds are invested in  different types  of instruments,  according to  the
limits  described above.  During  the  first years  of operation,  government  bonds have
16absorbed around 50% of the funds, although the percentage was temporarily  smaller for
some months in early 1998. Certificates of deposit, which started at 27%, have declined
to between 15 and 20%.  The investments in commercial papers and equities represent
approximately one fourth of the assets.
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The portfolio  structure is very similar across pension funds, reflecting a herding
behavior described by Srinivas and Yermo  (1999).  The lack of differentiation among
asset managers may  be caused by  two  different  regulations  - the  investment  limits
and/or  the relative rate of return  guarantee.  The limits have not  been binding at any
time,  with  the  exception of those  affecting government  bonds.  Instead, the  risk  of
falling below the minimum return  and having to  compensate fund members with  their
own assets may have worked as a strong disincentive for diversification among pension
fund managers. Returns  have been high  (13% annual average), but Srinivas and Yermo
showed that they might have been higher if asset managers had followed a benchmark
portfolio.  On the other hand, volatility has been much lower, reducing the short term
risk for future pensioners.
Investment in  foreign assets has been minimal, well below  1%, despite the fact
that regulations allow a maximum of 17%. The main reason for the lack of international
diversification seems to  be that  asset managers preferred to  invest in local instruments,
aiming at higher short term returns.
173.  THE PROBLEMS  OF THE NEW PENSION SYSTEM
The  new  pension  system in  Argentina has several important  advantages over
other pension systems -both  traditional and those recently reformed ones.  Having two
clear  and  explicit pillars, a  redistributive pillar  based on  a pay-as-you-go design, and
another  one proportional  to  contributions  as a fully funded scheme, the SIJP allows a
better distribution  of short and medium term risks, both institutional and financial.
However,  there are some serious problems with the Argentine Pension System.
These problems  are not  necessarily caused by the  system design or performance, but
nevertheless  they  result  in  lower  coverage, lower  benefits  or  higher  costs,  and,
consequently, influence the efficacy of the system.  Some of the main problems that can
be identified when considering the design and performance of the new pension system
are with  the PAYG scheme, while others are specific to the funded regime.  Regarding
the  PAYG  scheme, there  are the  problems  of low  coverage of the  system  and  the
financial sustainability of the scheme in the medium and long term.  The most serious
problems in the funded scheme are those related to the charges paid by members.
3.1  Coverage
Public pension  systems around  the world  have the general goal of offering the
highest possible benefits to the largest possible population,  within a budget constraint.
The Argentine Social Security System has traditionally had both  a high level of benefits
(replacement rate target of 82% of gross wages),  and coverage. As of 1995,  nearly 70% of
the  population  over  65 years of age had  a pension  benefit.  To  achieve these levels
however,  the pension  system incurred huge financial obligations, and  one of the main
reasons behind the reform in 1994  was to control rapidly growing pension expenditures.
In  the  past,  high  coverage,  despite  historically  low  female  labor  force
participation that  has only  recently begun to  increase, was due to relatively easy access
to benefits.  Low contribution  year requirements, plus a number of exemptions resulted
in a high coverage rate measured by the proportion  of elderly receiving benefits. As the
number  of  beneficiaries expanded without  a  corresponding  increase in  revenue,  the
resulting  financial difficulties led to  a  reduction  of average payments  and  increasing
deficits.  The new social security law established several new restrictive requirements,
including a five year increase in the minimum age and a ten year increase in the number
of years of contribution  required to  retire.  Requirements for  eligibility for disability
and survivors benefits were made more stringent.  The combination  of these measures
will gradually reduce the percentage of older persons receiving pensions, other things
constant.
The trend could be reversed or at least reduced if the level of formality in the labor
force and  compliance  of social security contributions  increase significantly in  future
18years 7. Unfortunately, the evidence  from 1994  to date shows that the number of actual
SIJP contributors has decreased  slightly  in absolute  terms once we exclude  the effect  of
the absorption of several provincial systems.  Moreover, due to the aging in society,
projections indicate that coverage  will seriously  decline  in the next few decades. For
instance, the proportion of individuals  reaching  the normal retirement age who will
actually receive  a retirement benefit could decline  by nearly 50%  in the next 2; years,
even if the level of formality in employment  increases  steadily. 8 This decline  is mostly
explained  by the increase  in the vesting  period to 30 years  and the declining  formality  in
labor markets in the last 20 years. Many of today's retirees  obtained  their benefit under
much easier  eligibility  rules years  ago, and the proportion of the labor force  with formal
employment is now below 50%. Thus, as current beneficiaries  age and die, the flow of
new beneficiaries  will be barely enough  to maintain  the total number of retirees around
the current level,  while the older population  will grow steadily,  resulting  in a decline  in
coverage.
Figure 7. Persons  older  than the minimum  retirement  age in the SIJP  eligible  for
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NOTE: (*) The indicated  percentages  do not represent  the total social  security  coverage  of
Argentina, but only the proportion  receiving a Retirement benefit from the SIJP.
Source: Stirparo (1999)
7  This effect was expected by proponents  of the reform in the early 1990s.  The main argument
was that the higher incentives to contribute would increase compliance quite rapidly.
8  The values projected assume that the female activity rates will grow slowly, reaching 5)% by
2050; unemployment  is assumed to decline to levels close to 7% in 2009, and the percentage
of employed who contribute to the SIJP will reach 50% in that same year.
19The stagnation  in the number of contributors to the SIJP is worrisome,  since  it
was expected  that the introduction of the individual  account  scheme  and the reductions
in  employers' contributions established in  recent years would act as incentives  to
increase  participation. Although it is not possible  to determine  unequivocally  the reason
for such low compliance,  a number of processes,  such as an increase  in unemployment,
and the proliferation of informal  hiring mechanisms  had a role in the poor performance
of the new system with regard to participation.  The solution to this problem is not
simple,  mainly because  informality  has deep structural causes  that go beyond the design
of the pension  system.
The first issue to  address urgently is related to  the situation of self-employed
workers. Law 24.241  requires that they contribute 27% of a predefined  income to the
social security system plus 5% to  old age health insurance.  There are ten income
categories,  and workers are assigned  to them according  to activity, seniority, et cetera.
This structure generates  important inequities among self-employed  workers (because
workers with  similar income levels pay  different contributions) and between self-
employed workers and employees.  Any self-employed  worker who receives  an average
monthly income of $300  has a clear disadvantage  in relation to employees,  because  the
labor taxes paid will be higher.  In the same way, self-employed  workers with higher
income could be affected  because  they are included  in an excessively  high category  for
their real incomes. In other cases,  they may be paying  too little. The low percentage  of
total  contributions  that  is  effectively transferred to  their  individual accounts
(approximately  23%),  and the regulations  on collection  from self-employed  workers  that
have had a tendency to raise the required contributions (by almost 65% in real terms
from the beginning  of 1994  to 1997)  are a strong incentive  to evade  the system. Besides,
the system  currently includes  several  discriminating  features  for this group, such as not
applying the recent reductions to the employer contribution rates or the requirement
that contributions  be paid within established  terms to be considered  in the estimates  of
regularity for survivors and disability benefits - a condition that does not apply to
employees. Because  of these problems,  the number of self-employed  contributors  to the
SIJP dropped between 1994  and 1999  from approximately  1.3 millions  to slightly more
than  700,0009.
It  is  both  necessary and  feasible to  implement policies that  facilitate the
participation of  self-employed  workers.  Certain measures like improving the  link
between contributions and net income would improve the transparency  and the equity
of the system. It also seems  reasonable  to extend to self-employed  workers any benefit
that is given  currently to employees,  like the reduction of employer contributions. The
link between  contributions  and real income would eliminate  the huge incentive  to evade
that currently exists for self-employed  workers who do not hold a regular activity,
because  it would eliminate  an important bureaucratic  constraints  to entering  and exiting
the self-employed  condition,  currently in force.
9  Further  research  on the elasticity  of participation  among  the self-employed  to the marginal
tax  rates  imposed  on them  would  be  useful  for assessing  the potential  for increasing  coverage.
20A second measure worth considering is a serious review of the collection system.
For many reasons, the Tax Authority  has not been efficient in reducing evasion.  Broad
policy  measures, such as reductions  of contributions  by  employers  and tax  amnesty
offers have been taken  without  much success.  Clearly,  it is necessary to improve the
enforcement strategies of the collecting agency, which seem to be weak.) 0
Finally, it is important  to  mention that,  even if participation by active workers
increases, the  number  of  individuals  who  will  reach  retirement  age without  the
minimum contributions  will grow in the next ten to twenty  years, due to their lack of
contributions  early in their labor careers.  For the lower income members of this group,
a non-contributory  pension will be needed.
3.2  The financial  viability  of the Public Social Security System
The financial viability  of the public  scheme or  RPP  has been  a controversial
issue, due to the difficulties it will face in paying benefits due both  to  the underlying
structural  deficits  as  well  as  the  loss  of  revenues  during  the  transition  period.
Additionally, the  policy of reducing employer  contributions  has significantly affected
the finances of the ANSeS, reducing contributions  by approximately 40% by mid 1999.
In the analysis of the financial situation of the public system, it is important  to
look  separately at the  expenditure  and  revenue  issues.  The system  expenditures  on
Social Security benefits are related to  the  number  of beneficiaries and  their  average
benefit levels. The process of population  aging in Argentina, along with the maturity of
the pension system meant that the number of beneficiaries tended to grow steadily over
time. The  1994 reform tried to  restrict this effect by increasing the retirement  age and
imposing more stringent requirements to obtain benefits. It also reduced future benefits
payable by the PAYG scheme, by effectively transferring part of them to the ne-w  fully
funded scheme.
The future  evolution  of the  PAYG  revenue  is not  simple to  analyze, mostly
because the scheme is not  expected to  be self financing in  the future.  The Argentine
pension system has been allocated a growing flow  of earmarked non-payroll  taxes in
recent years.  The system was running  a significant deficit before the reform and,  of
course,  the  creation  of  the  second pillar  reduced  revenue.  However,  other  policy
measures had an even greater effect on collection.  As discussed above, the Government
has slowly reduced the employers' contribution  rate from  16% of gross wages to nearly
7.5% by the end of 1999.  In addition, new legal contractual forms were authorized to
promote  labor  demand,  allowing  in  many  cases the  deferment  or  elimination  of
contributions for some categories of workers.  Consequently, by the end of 1999, almost
65%  of  benefit  expenditures  were  financed  by  sources  other  than  payroll  tax
contributions  and this percentage continues to grow.
10  For a detailed  description  of the collection system in Argentina and other Latin American
countries,  see Demarco  and Rofman  (1998).
21The  evolution  of the  financial situation  of the  RPP  will improve  in  future
decades for the  same reason that the  coverage problem  will emerge.  The projections
show that the public scheme's finances should improve  significantly due to  stagnation
and even a decrease of the  number of beneficiaries and to  a reduction in the amounts
paid as benefits begin to be replaced by those of the funded scheme.  Obviously, if that
happens, the system  will be in  better  financial shape, because of the  exclusion of an
important  part  of  society from  the  system.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the population
excluded from the Social Security system were covered by a non-contributory  pension
of some kind, part of the financial savings would be offset by new expenditures in this
area.
Of  course, the  financial outcomes  for  the  RPP"  will  depend directly on  the
decisions adopted in relation to employer contributions.  Figure 8 shows the results of a
projection under  three different assumptions regarding the rates of contributions:  16%
(indicated by law), 9% (approximately the current level) and 4%, a minimum level" 2.
Figure 8. Projected financial result of the RPP, according to different levels of
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Source:  Own, based  on Stirparo (1999)
As shown, if a 16% rate were applied, the accounts would tend to equilibrate by
2010, while, with the current rate, an equilibrium  level would only be reached by 2028.
11 In this paper, we consider  the financial  result of the RPP as the difference  between  ANSeS
revenues  coming  from social  security  contributions and its expenditures  due to social  security
benefits.  Consequently,  we exclude the effect of tax resources,  transfers  from the treasury,
collection  or payments  of other ANSeS  managed  systems,  etc.
12 This model assumes  a slight growth of the activity rate, a drop of unemployment  rate to
levels  close  to 7%, an increase  in the percentage  of employed people who contribute from
current 40% to 50%, a drop in the percentage  of employed  workers and a steady  increase  of
participation  in the funded  scheme,  reaching 100%  of workers  by 2025.
22If further reductions were made the system would not be able to avoid a chronic deficit
situation.  The  fiscal effect of the  reduction  of employer  contributions  is clear: each
point  of reduction  in  the  rate  currently  translates  into  a  loss of approximately  $450
million (0.15% of GDP) per year in revenues that  must be financed with funds coming
from other sources.  This does not take into account any positive impact on the number
of contributors that could be linked to lower labor costs, but four years after employers'
contributions  began to  be  reduced, there  is  no  evidence that  such  an  effect can  be
expected.'3
3.3  Benefit uncertainty
Law  24.241,  which  created  the  SIJP,  established  an  automatic  indexation
mechanism  for  all the  financial  variables  of  the  system.  Benefits  of  the  RPP,  the
minimum  and maximum contributions,  the fines applicable to AFJPs and contributions
of  self-employed workers  were  all defined  as a  function  of  the  Average Individual
Mandatory Contribution  (Aporte Medio Previsional Obligatorio-AMPO).  The AMPO
would  be recalculated every semester and its evolution  would follow the evolution  of
average wages of the economy.  Therefore, the system would be completely indexed to
the  wage level.  This  criteria  was an important  advance with  regard to  the  previous
system, which established multiple criteria for the different variables in particular, a link
between the benefits and a wage index estimated by the Ministry  of Labor and Social
Security, whose methodology  was far from  being transparent  and led to thousands of
lawsuits.  The value of the AMPO  was calculated by the end of 1993 based on the Social
Security collection during the first semester of 1993 at $61.  Between this date and the
first  semester  1997, this  value was increased by  31% reaching  $80.  This  imDortant
change does not  reflect an increase in workers  wages (which, based on  data from the
same  source,  grew  by  approximately  3%  between  1993  and  1999), but  several
methodological effects, in some cases unexpected and in other cases resulting from clear
mistakes made by government  officials. As a reaction to the fiscal cost that indexing all
benefits would produce, the government modified the law and replaced the AMPO with
a new index (the Social Security Module, Modulo Previsional-MOPRE). The MOPRE
value is defined by the Ministries of Economy  and Labor (its value has been set at $80
since 1997).'4
14 At the beginning  of 1995,  and because  of the evidence  that a 14.3%  increase  in the AIMPO
would generate a  similar increase in  Social Security system expenditures, the national
government  issued  a Decree of Necessity  and Urgency, afterwards  confirmed by the Social
Security Solidarity Law, that  elimninated  indexation, and instead ties adjustments  to  the
definition  the Congress  adopts every  year when it discuss  the National Budget.  This measure,
justified by the impossibility  of paying the foreseen  increases,  eliminated  a quite important
component of Law 24.241,  the automatic indexation procedure.  Additionally,  the Social
Security  Solidarity  Act determined  the freezing of benefits  that were being paid, but it did
not modify the mechanism  to determine  new benefits. Consequently,  inequities  started to
emerge,  since different  workers received  different amounts of money as PBU, depending  on
the date of retirement. By the end of 1997,  again  through a decree,  the national  government
replaced  the AMPO with the Social  Security  Module (M6dulo  Previsional-MOPRE),  a unit
whose value is determined by  the Ministries of Labor and Economy and that  would
determine  the movement  of all variables  in the system.
23The lack of automatic indexation  mechanisms  seriously  affects  the predictability
of the system,  for both beneficiaries  and policy  makers,  and it increases  the possibility  of
political manipulation. Therefore,  it is necessary  to reinstall  a methodology  that ties the
value of the benefits  to an objective  indicator.
3.4 The cost-effectiveness  of the Funded  Regime
3.4.1. The costs  of the AFJPs
The  system is  designed in  such a  way that  the  funded  scheme channels
improvements  in the economy  at the macro  level  to beneficiaries.  It also diversifies  risks
and protects  the contributors  from possible  political  manipulations  of benefit  levels. To
fulfill these functions adequately,  it is necessary  for the system to generate  reasonable
rates of return, with reasonably  low costs  and limited  risk.
Two of the main problems  the funded scheme  has faced  since its creation are its
relatively high  operating costs and the  risks to  which  contributors are  exposed.
Currently, the average  commissions  including  disability  and survivor insurance  premia
are slightly over 3.4%  of the taxable income (or 30%  of the tax collection). This seems
high when compared with other countries  with similar systems.1 5 It is interesting  to
note that this high average  is due, in part, to the existence  of very low price elasticity  in
demand.  The average  commission  could be approximately  2.95%  if each contributor
chose  the cheapest  AFJP for his/her level  of income.  (Of course,  this comparison  makes
the possibly unrealistic  assumption  qualitative  differences  (e.g.,  service)  across  the AFJPs
are not related  to price.)
The debate on the magnitude  of the costs  has been heated" 6. It is obvious  that to
define whether a service  is expensive  or cheap is necessary  to have a reference  criterion,
comparing the cost with other similar services,  or trying to  evaluate the utility the
contributors get from the service. Whitehouse  (2000)  points out that the key question  is
what effect  do charges  have on the net rate of return. While costs may be high relative
to comparators,  returns in Argentina  have  also been  high,  even after  these charges.
Fees of approximately  30% of contributions  look high.  However, it must be
noticed that there are no asset fees or any other charges  except for the up-front fees.
Considering  an individual  with contributions  for 35 years  before retirement, it is simple
to estimate  that a 30%  fee on contribution is similar  to a 2% annual fee on assets,  if we
include the  cost of disability and death insurance in the calculation, and 1% of we
exclude  this cost. Thus, it is possible  to estimate  that the effect  of administration  fees  on
15 Currently,  the commissions  in other  Latin-American  countries  reach  27.2%  in Peru,  25.9%
in Colombia,  21.5%  in Chile  (where  there  has  been  a decreasing  tendency  from  the inception
of the system)  and 17.6%  in Uruguay,  always  in relation  to total  contributions  and  including
insurance  premna.
16 For the  international  debate,  see  Whitehouse  (2000).
24long term returns should be between 0.7 and 1.5 percentage  points.  Of course, this
effect  will be larger if workers participate  in the system for shorter periods (as would be
the case of an older worker that joined the funded scheme in  1994) and smaller if
workers contribute for more than 35 years.  Nevertheless,  lower costs are clearly
desirable,  and recent returns may  not be maintained  at such  high levels  in the long run.
While some analyses  have  found that the costs are actually  low when compared
with other alternative financial  products, this comparison is fraught with problems.
While comparisons are complex, it is interesting to  consider the  destination of the
resources  received  by the AFJPs. Figure 9 shows  the structure of operating expenses  of
the AFJPs, as a percentage  of the social security collection for each fiscal year  July-
June),  since  the beginning  of the system.
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We can easily observe  that the total costs have decreased  since the beginning  of
the system  -when they exceeded  40%  of the collection-, up to the fifth year -when they
are below 25%.  This reduction  was due originally  to lower costs of disability  and death
insurance  and the reduction  of adrministrative  expenses. Since  late 1997,  the reduction in
expenditures  on marketing  and sales  force has been greater. Regardless  of the evolution
of expenses however, the  level of commissions  has been practically fixed from the
beginning  of the system,  with a slight downward tendency. Therefore, the operating
profits reached  by the AFJP in recent years  have been positive and with a tendency to
25grow, reaching a record of 7% of total collection (or 23% of AFJPs' gross revenue).  The
reduction  in  costs  may  have  reached  a  limit  in  recent  months,  as  sales  force
compensation  has  leveled  and  insurance  costs  are  rising.  Nevertheless,  the  high
operating profits could be indicating that the market is not as competitive as it could be,
and some policy measures to increase competition should be adopted.
Two  different approaches have been proposed to  reduce the fees in the system.
One  proposal  is that  the  government  should  promote  a  reduction  in  costs of  the
managing companies, as an indirect way to reduce charges. For example, a draft law has
been  presented  in  Congress  to  set  maximum  levels  of  commissions.  While  well
intentioned,  such measures could result in higher market  concentration  and decline in
quality of service, as well as market cartelization. Instead, policies that would promote
price competition may achieve a similar resul  without the negative outcomes.
In  an attempt  to  reduce costs, industry  representatives have proposed limiting
workers' rights to switch funds. The logic of this restriction is that fewer switches will
lead AFJPs  to  reduce expenses in  areas related to  attracting  new  contributors.  This
measure could facilitate a reduction  in the expenses of AFJPs (because  they would not
need to spend as much on marketing), but it would limit the possibility of choice of the
contributors  and,  therefore,  the  efficiency driven by  competition.  Consequently,  the
drop in AFJP costs would not necessarily be translated into reductions of charges if the
-administrators tend to  collude, and we could end up  with  a  more concentrated,  less
competitive and equally expensive system.
Alternatively,  other  authors  as Braberman  and  Chisari  (1999) have proposed
simplifying and liberating the rules for transfers.  The idea in this case  is that the existing
restrictions to transfering from one AFJP to  another reduce competition in the market,
and  increase the  benefit  a  managing company  obtains  when  a worker  joins  them.
Instead, if the contributor  could change without the intervention  of sales representatives
(through  automated mechanisms) and as often as he/she wants, the "value" of adding a
contributor  would be lower and the AFJPs would not  spend large amounts to  attract
new affiliates.
Clearly,  an approach that promotes  higher competition  should result in  lower
fees. However, if the sensitivity of the contributors to differences in AFJPs costs is low,
then incentives for the AFJPs to compete on prices are small.  If all contributors  chose
to  transfer  to  the  lower  cost  AFJP according  to  his/her  income  level, the  average
commission will be reduced by 15% without changes in fees by any AFJP.  To increase
cost awareness among fund members, it is necessary that  the supervisory agency (the
Superintendency of AFJPs) provide information about the AFJPs costs and their effect
on future benefits.  Both mass media and traditional communication channels with the
existing contributors  should be used as much as possible.
An  interesting  approach  can  be  observed  in  the  mechanism  of  allocating
undecided  affiliates.  According to  the  current  regulation, workers  entering  the  SIJP
must choose within 30 days whether they want to join the second pillar PAYG scheme
or any  specific AFJP.  If they  do not  act, they are distributed  randomly  among the
existing AFJP.  The number  of workers who have entered the funded regime through
26this mechanism is quite high, almost 30% of the total  number of current  contributors.
The figure is even greater with  respect to  the  flow of new  contributors  in  the  year,
reaching  almost  60%.  The  criterion  for  allocating  undecided  workers  from  the
beginning of the system up to  September 1997 was to  assign them proportionally  by
their  market  share.  Since then, they  have been assigned in  equal proportions  to  all
AFJPs.  If, instead, they were assigned to the AFJP with lowest commission, this should
reduce the average cost.  On one hand, more contributors  would be in the low  est cost
AFJP, but it would also create a strong incentive to compete on prices" 7.
Market Concentration
The  process  of  concentration  in  the  sector  -which  had  24  administrators
operating  when  the  system began and  13 by the  end  of  1999 - should  be  carefully
monitored.  As of the end  of  1999, more than  70% of the  contributors  belong to  4
AFJPs, with the largest one covering 21% of the market.  While it is desirable to allow
the different companies to develop their own strategies to reach the optimum  number of
contributors  for  their  scale of  activity, the  risk  of  an  excessive concentration  that
restricts competition  in the  industry  should be considered.  In this  context,  it would
seem reasonable to consider concentration limits (e.g., a maximum 20% share) in order
to avoid a situation where one or two firms control the market.
3.4.2.  Regulation alternatives to increase the efficiency: The problem of volatility
Another issue that deserves some attention is the risk AFJP contributors  face due
to  volatility  of returns  on  investments.  Volatility  generates two  different problems.
First,  volatility  of the  funds while  workers  are still active  affects credibility  of the
system, since workers may see their individual account  balances drop rapidly  in some
periods.  This  does not  generate any immediate  harm to  the  workers,  because their
benefits depend on the balance of their personal  accounts when they  retire,  and  not
before.  Nevertheless,  the  Superintendency  limits  investment  in  highly  volatile
instruments  as well as investments on low liquidity instruments  with  non-transparent
markets.
Volatility  at the  time  of  retirement  is  more  important,  because of the  real
possibility that individual account balances are abruptly reduced immediately before an
annuity is purchased.  One question to consider is how sensitive is the benefit a worker
will receive from the SIJP to changes in capital markets.  Considering the role of PBU
and  PC,  plus that  an important  percentage of  pension  funds  assets are fixed return
instruments, it is possible to show that a drop in the capital markets would have a minor
effect for all the workers who retire in the next few years.  This is because neither the
PBU nor  the PC are affected by capital market  volatility,  and, at the same time,  the
benefit generated by the individual account of the funded scheme will be small.  In the
longer term, the effect would be still be small for many workers, since more than 50% of
them  may expect to  receive more than  half their  retirement  benefit in the  form  of a
17 Additionally,  it would  seem  reasonable  to give  to the undecided  people who are entering  the
system  a period  of time  to decide  if  they want to shift to the pay-as-you-go  regime, iIl  order
to increase  the possibility  of exercising  their freedom  of choice.
27PBU.  These lower income workers will receive a high share from the flat, public benefit
because the level is high relative to their own wages.
Although the magnitude of the problem  seems to be smaller than thought,  it is
reasonable to  explore  alternatives that  restrict  its effect.  One  possibility  is that  the
AFJPs offer their clients a second portfolio concentrated in fixed earnings instruments.
This  fund  would  allow  members  to  restrict  their  exposure  to  market  volatility,
decreasing the risk of retiring at a relatively low level, although it is clear that the costs
of more security will be reflected in lower expected returns.  If a measure like this is
implemented, it would  be important  to  limit  the possibilities of making fast and full
transfers from a "traditional"  to a "conservative" funds, in order to  reduce the negative
effects of financial panics.' 8
Another  alternative is to  allow the progressive acquisition of deferred annuities.
If, for instance, a worker  is five years from  retirement,  he could start to progressively
acquire an annuity, transferring 20% of the individual account balance to the retirement
insurance company chosen by him every year.  This would further reduce his exposure
to short term variations in the market, because these would only affect part of the funds.
This  mechanism is relatively  simple to  implement,  because it would  only  require  a
choice of retirement insurance company in advance with an automatic transfer the funds
progressively.  The application of such an  idea should  be seriously considered for the
medium  and long term,  when the  benefits of the  funded  regime start to  be  a more
significant part  of the  retirement  payment.  However,  a  successful implementation
requires the existence of annuity providers operating in the context of a strong and well-
regulated insurance industry,  a  requirement  that  if far  from  being fully achieved in
Argentina, as we will see next.
3.5  The insurance industry  and its relation  with  the pension  system.
Insurance companies have a role in the pension system  at two  different stages.
First, AFJPs are required to  buy an insurance policy to  cover disability and mortality
risks.  If a worker contributing to the fully funded scheme dies or becomes disabled, the
AFJP is required to complement his individual account balance up to an amount enough
to  buy  an  annuity  that  would  provide  a  lifetime  defined  benefit.  In  addition,
beneficiaries may  choose  to  receive  their  monthly  payments  through  an  annuity
provided  by  an  insurance company.  The  markets  for  both  activities  seem to  have
serious problems of competition  and regulation as discussed next.
3.5.1.  The disability and death insurance
In the case of disability and life insurance, practically all the insurance companies
are part of the same economic group as the AFJP that contracts  them  (the only AFJPs
that do not contract related companies are the two  smallest, with  less than  1.5% of the
market).  This situation makes it very difficult to assess  whether the prevailing insurance
rates correspond to reasonable market value or if they reflect financial transfers between
18 This option is already  available  in the private pension systems  in Chile and Poland.
28related companies. Grushka (1999)  showed  that there is an important dispersion  in the
fees, ranging (in December 1998)  from 0.59%  to 1.45%  of the taxable income, with no
relationship between  these differences  and any characteristic  of the insured population,
such as the scale  of the AFJP, gender,  employment  condition,  age or income level  of the
contributors.
Additionally, there  are  no  serious studies  about  incidence rates, making
extremely difficult  to assess  if insurance  companies'  reserves  are adequate,  insufficient  or
excessive. Currently, the retirement insurance industry reports an annual loss of $25
million, and re-insurance  companies  lost more than 120  million. These figures  should  be
analyzed considering  that there are serious difficulties  in defining the adequac) of the
established  technical  reserves. As a matter of fact, a generalized  problem in the industry
is that the reported deaths and disabilities  are significantly  less  than the expected  ones,
therefore it is possible  that excessive  reserves  are accumulating,  affecting  the result in a
negative way9.
Insurance  company  officials  have  mentioned  that  available  data  indicates  a
possible  underestimation  of  real  costs  by  re-insurance  companies,  allowing  them  to
charge  less than  expected.  If this  is correct,  we could  expect  an increase  in insurance  cost
in the  next  few years,  as re-insurers  correct  their  estimations.  Also,  the  participation  of
ANSeS  in  financing  the  transition  period  will  decline  over  time.  The  increase  in
individual  account  balances  (due to  longer  periods  of contributions)  may  not  seem to  be
enough  to  compensate  this,  resulting  in an additional  trend  towards  increasing  insurance
costs.  An  active  role  of  the  Supervision  to  increase  transparency  in  the  contracting
process  and  generate  reliable  incidence  data  will  be important  to  prevent  the  disability
and survivors  benefits from  becoming  a major  problem  in the system.
3.5.2.  The benefits in the funded scheme
The  new  system  allows  beneficiaries  from  the  fully  funded  scheme  to  choose
whether  they  want to  receive their  payout  as an annuity  (through  a retirement  insurance
company)  or  as a  scheduled  withdrawal.  In  this  last  case,  the  beneficiary  remains  a
member  of the  pension  fund,  and  he  makes  monthly  withdrawals  from  his  individual
account,  maintaining  the  ownership  of  the  funds 20. The  main  reason  to  create  this
mechanism  was to  introduce  competition  with  annuity  providers.  But  it also has several
negative  effects in the  system.  It  gives workers  the  possibility  of opting  out  of annuity
markets,  opening  room  for  adverse  selection.  Since regulations  establish  that  in the  case
of  death  of  the  beneficiary  with  no  spouse  or  underage  children  the  balance  of the
account  will  be inheritable  following  normal  criteria,  part  of the  resources  accumulated
for  retirement  may  end  up  being  transferred  out  of the  system,  reducing  the  average
19  The reason why there  are "too  few" deaths is not clear. On  one hand, it is posible that the
assumptions  made  by  the  insurance  companies  are exaggerated, but  it  is  clear that  the
mortality  levels reported  are significantly lower  than  the  expected ones for the  Argentine
population  in  general.  Among  the  possible  causes,  we  could  find  an  important  detay  in
processing  the  applications,  ignorance  by survivors,  etc..
20  The  amount  withdrawn  every  month  must  be  agreed with  the  AFJP,  with  a maximum  limit
equal to what  an annuity  would  pay to  this  beneficiary.
29benefits that are paid to the beneficiaries. Grushka (1999)  estimated  that the loss of
funds might cause a reduction of as much as 15% in average  benefits as a result of
unintended bequests.
With regard to market transparency,  there is a serious  problem in the annuity
providers industry.  More than 85% of annuities are issued  by a retirement insurance
company  tied to the AFJP where the beneficiary  was affiliated  prior to retirement. This
suggests  that competition is very weak.  A partial explanation  of this situation is the
total lack of transparency in the market.  Each insurance company offers an annuity
product structured in a different way, making almost  impossible  to fully  compare  them.
Regulations should aim to  produce simple product, making easier the  comparison
among  different  offers.
There are other problems in the way annuities  are defined  that make them more
expensive for retirees, reducing the benefits.  On  one hand, mortality assumptions
currently used are based  on higher life expectancies  than the real ones for the Argentine
population, generating  a reduction in benefits  of 6 to 8% (Grushka,  1997).  It is not clear
whether these reductions are justified by higher life expectancy  of annuitants. At the
same  time, no indexation is included in the contracts, so that the real value of benefits
could drop significantly. This problem is partially solved  since annuities  can be defined
as variable (with a  percentage of  returns  obtained over the  guaranteed 4% being
transferred to beneficiaries)  and they can also be defined  in U.S. dollars, reducing  the
country-specific  risk.
Finally,  the  mechanisms of  financial and  institutional supervision of  the
retirement insurance  companies  seem  to be less  solid than those applied  to AFJPs. The
reason is,  partly,  the  institutional weakness of  the  National  Superintendency  of
Insurance, as well as differences  in criteria used by insurance versus pension system
regulators. The  debate  over  the  need  for  appropriate regulations and  market
transparency  in the annuity providers industry in Argentina and other Latin American
countries has been growing over the past couple of years. Palacios  and Rofman (2000)
present a detailed  discussion  on the current situation and policy  options on this issue.
304.  CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a general overview of the pension system in Argentina after
the 1994 reform,  describing the  basic features of the new system and presenting some
information  on performance during its first six years.  The main section is devoted to
considering the problems that have to  be confronted and solved in order  to  guarantee
successful development of the system in the future.
Four  areas critical for the consolidation of the system are identified.  The first
one  is the  coverage level, which  will tend to  decrease in the  future unless structural
changes take place quickly in the labor market  in Argentina. The reform of the social
security system implemented in  1994 made the contributory  elements strictre in terms
of eligibility (especially the thirty  year vesting period).  This leads to  greater financial
stability but at the cost of excluding of a group of individuals that would have otherwise
received benefits.  While this goal may seem reasonable to promote  compliance, it has
made it  necessary to  develop an  efficient and  transparent  non-contributory  pension
system, in order to offer some financial support to the people who do not have access  to
the benefits of the  system.  This would  of course, offset the  fiscal savings from  the
reformed public scheme to a certain extent.
The second issue, financial sustainability of the public scheme (which includes
the old system, the new first pillar, the new PAYG second pillar  and the tran-;itional
benefits) seems stable in the medium term, as a consequence of the reform. Nevertheless,
the financing of the transition  process, that will take approximately 20 years, should be
planned in more detail.  In addition, the reductions in the current and planned employer
contributions  will strongly influence the system's financial balance.  In particular, there
should be an explicit allocation of tax resources to cover the projected deficits caused by
the reduction  in earmarked labor taxes.  It is interesting to note that there  is so far no
evidence that  reducing  labor  taxes has  had  any  positive  impact  on  formal  sector
participation and compliance, although more study is needed before conclusions can be
made.
Due to  errors  in  the original implementation,  the automatic indexation  of the
benefits of the public regime was eliminated in 1995, so that benefit adjustments are now
defined on  a discretionary  basis by the government.  It  is important  to  reintroduce  a
technically and financially reasonable mechanism for automatic indexation, to  increase
the transparency and predictability of the pay-as-you-go  system.
The challenge of reducing administrative costs of the fully funded scheme was
highlighted.  Mechanisms  to  reduce  them  should  be  found  while  protecting  the
competitive aspects of the new system.  Among the reasons identified that  may explain
costs, it  is clear that  the  low price elasticity of demand is fundamental.  In fact, the
contributors  do  not  seem  to  make  their  choice  of  AFJP  taking  into  account  the
commission they are charged.  To  correct this, it is critical that supervising institutions
make an effort to increase the information the affiliates have on the subject.  An issue
that  should  also be considered carefully is the level of concentration  of the industry,
31which could lead to cartelization  and price collusion. Therefore,  careful supervision  is
required. Replacing  the current mechanism  of allocation  of undecided  contributors with
one that favors  the AFJP with lower  fee would certainly  generate  an incentive  to reduce
the commissions.
Much has been said about the need to  protect contributors from short-term
market volatility. This problem may have received  more attention than warranted in
Argentina,  since  a large  part of benefits  will still  come from the public  scheme,  and short
term  volatility during contributing years have no  serious consequences  for  most
workers.  Some additional protection to retiring workers could be devised, such as
creating a second,  less volatile portfolio for those close to retirement, or allowing  the
acquisition  of deferred annuities  before retirement, but neither solution seems  critical,
nor are the proposed  solutions  without their own problems.
The disability,  life insurance  and retirement annuities market present potential
conflicts  that should  be resolved. The main problems  in this area  are concentrated  in the
lack of reliable  studies on incidence  rates (which might be much higher that currently
estimated),  the use of unreasonable  assumptions  in actuarial estimates,  and the weak
competition in the markets. Besides,  the supervision  of the industry is also weak and
rather slow,  generating  important  risks  to the system. Regarding  annuities,  we conclude
that mandatory  annuitization  of benefits  (eliminating  or limiting scheduled  withdrawals)
is to be recommended,  although  serious  work to improve efficiency  and competition in
the annuities  market is required.
In short, the new Argentine  social  security system,  after six years  of operation, is
still going through a development  process  and a number of problems, some of them
important in the medium  term, and others more urgent, should  be corrected.
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34STATISTICAL  APPENDIX
(Source for all tables: Superintendency of Pension Funds).
35TABLE  I
PENSION  FUND  MEMBERSHIP
AFJP  DIc-94  Jun-95  Dic-95  Jun-96  Dic-96  Jun-97  Dic-97  Jun-98  Dic-98  Jun-99  Dic-99
ACTIVA  108,420  122,107  132,235  -
ACTIVA  ANTICIPAR  101,047  121,880  143,368  340,139  312,755  - - - -
AFIANZAR  13,241  17,765  21,941  23,161  22,563  23,752  25,447  38,930  - - -
ARAUCA  BIT  60,423  69,565  82,812  86,344  86,108  90,136  103,130  127,647  160,352  196,096  234,661
BANAT  69,080  n/d  448  369  335  339  - - - - -
CLARIDAD  205,026  222,842  263,433  274,864  288,029  271,824  272,282  287,019  - - -
CONSOLIDAR  478,731  534,033  667,209  740,427  821,445  907,346  971,695  1,256,414  1,298,880  1,336,634  1,376,674
DIGNITAS  70,260  - - - - - - - - - -
ETHIKA  578  1,454  2,208  2,826  - - - - - -
JACARANDA  46,036  54,672  60,650  59,628  61,633  50,189  48,009  60,767  74,643  90,948
FECUNDA  98,206  116,728  150,345  181,020  195,176  214,717  224,094  - - -
FUTURA  32,220  36,067  44,007  46,895  49,567  51,586  52,195  65,084  79,107  97,983  117,119
GENERAR  28,597  30,801  37,071  39,886  40,110  46,051  54,573  70,030  81,878  104,875  131,981
MAS  VIDA  7,376  21,700  76,665  85,599  68,474  52,954  - - - - -
MAXiMA  454,162  511,756  635,991  723,528  795,186  880,775  1,067,219  1,126,120  1,171,728  1,227,246  1,277,751
NACI6N  394,378  412,884  476,112  487,270  456,343  481,694  514,928  537,470  564,903  596,070  626,185
ORIGENES  295,801  383,341  517,398  565,826  587,203  957,767  1,095,953  1,135,509  1,460,117  1,492,097  1,518,669
PATRIMONIO  109,030  112,437  128,442  130,408  119,414  108,011  - - - - -
PREVINTER  193,298  277,078  387,174  460,389  501,076  549,545  586,306  623,516  644,257  668,550  690,258
PREVISOL  105,106  117,668  132,069  140,425  156,015  156,881  165,490  184,304  199,341  221,101  243,722
PROFESI6N  + AUGE  6,671  10,427  18,062  21,155  21,400  21,104  23,775  38,591  53,675  74,710  96,788
PRORENTA  80,223  85,973  101,971  111,154  122,105  130,217  135,276  155,147  219,650  236,558  344,494
SAN JOSE  22,041  23,322  27,760  28,776  27,065  28,215  28,479  41,459  54,694  73,652  -
SAVIA  44,798  43,999  46,590  - - - - - - - -
SIEMBRA  392,093  498,958  606,060  674,174  716,727  771,920  860,516  907,221  948,518  983,382  1,100,258
UNIDOS  14,170  15,642  19,221  20,945  23,342  25,511  27,076  41,020  55,380  75,348  95,803
TOTAL  FUNDED  3,431,012  3,843,099  4,779,242  5,245,208  5,472,071  5,820,534  6,256,443  6,696,248  7,067,123  7,475,250  7,854,363
SCHEME
PAYG SCHEME  2,900,793  2,839,948  2,708,948  2,598,248  2,544,382  2,396,397  2,328,468  2,280,960  2,251,419  2,238,692  2,224,773
UNDEFINED  322,498  293,475  207,234  322,470  295,547  370,030  254,698  217,082  260,368  242,892  293,640
TOTAL  6,654,303  6,976,522  7,695,424  8,165,926  8,312,000  8,586,961  8,839,609  9,194,290  9,578,910  9,956,834  10,372,776
1TABLE 11
CONTRIBUTORS, BY AFJP or PAYG scheme
AFJP  Dic-94  Jun-95  Dic-95  Jun-96  DIc-96  Jun-97  Dic-97  Jun-98  Dic-98  Jun-99  Dic-99
ACTIVA  65,050  63,057  70,877  - -
ACTIVA ANTICIPAR  55,104  59,039  71,559  146,829  143,479  - - -
AFIANZAR  7,571  9,263  11,015  10,666  9,759  9,656  9,298  13,677  - - -
ARAUCA BIT  33,403  37,409  49,201  45,869  45,224  47,856  54,044  70,754  91,913  105,205  126,008
CLARIDAD  124,369  110,355  132,187  119,123  111,336  107,433  97,701  104,621  - - -
CONSOLIDAR  303,272  301,773  401,617  399,175  443,275  489,281  504,173  646,913  663,725  637,519  644,360
DIGNITAS  43,731  - - - - - - - -
ETHIKA  206  679  1,203  1,456  - - - - - -
ETHIKA  23,491  22,885  26,430  21,307  18,776  17,451  14,880  20,389  27,138  29,298
FECUNDA  59,368  58,429  83,120  83,965  106,664  121,175  114,411  - - -
FUTURA  27,262  29,633  33,998  32,814  34,375  34,910  34,249  39,413  44,920  47,526  52,486
GENERAR  19,297  20,024  24,267  25,093  26,660  31,527  37,230  45,776  48,899  57,314  69,467
MAS VIDA  3,900  9,150  19,828  24,440  23,187  20,198  - - - - -
MAXIMA  281,890  272,858  355,230  368,724  432,510  484,917  539,426  570,805  594,528  570,708  583,601
NACI6N  212,519  197,456  253,059  227,482  208,868  223,945  230,436  241,647  259,735  248,246  263,538
ORIGENES  166,466  198,900  287,479  286,136  304,108  472,322  518,031  535,030  667,555  625,685  634,484
PATRIMONIO  59,241  54,928  63,273  55,948  44,781  38,946  - - - - -
PREVINTER  125,984  153,646  230,633  247,600  277,212  304,755  306,401  319,623  326,601  312,101  312,610
PREVISOL  70,350  66,638  77,753  70,145  68,805  71,045  71,408  80,732  86,530  88,229  94,782
PROFESION + AUGE  5,863  7,262  11,016  11,516  11,455  11,595  12,052  18,817  26,093  32,061  39,627
PRORENTA  53,620  46,565  54,074  51,574  58,704  62,527  60,085  67,344  93,495  91,305  126,408
SAN JOSE  14,855  14,091  17,486  15,287  12,545  12,762  12,000  16,853  21,988  26,806  -
SAVIA  12,910  12,580  12,771  - - - - - - - -
SIEMBRA  247,148  274,575  342,153  326,165  365,087  407,955  441,234  460,214  477,861  462,199  496,835
UNIDOS  11,783  12,198  13,870  14,540  15,440  16,411  16,478  22,239  28,195  32,004  39,059
TOTAL FUNDED  2,028,653  2,033,393  2,644,099  2,585,854  2,762,250  2,986,667  3,073,537  3,274,847  3,459,176  3,366,206  3,483,265
SCHEME
PAYG SCHEME  2,099,551  1,844,194  1,660,959  1,426,603  1,318,893  1,259,600  1,110,792  1,044,022  1,029,080  910,137  914,183
UNDEFINED  322;498  293,475  138,172  225,432  154,421  165,341  139,394  136,585  148,556  119,325  107,518
TOTAL  4,450,702  4,171,062  4,443,230  4,237,889  4,235,564  4,411,608  4,323,723  4,455,454  4,636,812  4,395,668  4,504,966
2TABLE III
BENEFICIARIES  IN THE FUNDED SCHEME
Type of benefit
DATE  Retirees*  Disability  Survivors*  TOTAL
Frac.  Sched.  Ann.  N/D  TOTAL  Frac.  Sched.  Ann.  N/D  TOTAL
Dic-95  2  2  0  37  41  143  0  126  172  2,051  2,349  2,533
Jun-96  4  5  0  101  110  366  0  265  684  3,424  4,373  4,849
Dic-96  50  20  0  268  338  766  0  683  1,595  4,562  6,840  7,944
Jun-97  151  72  1  550  774  1,198  0  855  3,037  5,066  8,958  10,930
Dic-97  427  233  4  1,316  1,980  2,370  6  988  7,346  4,469  12,809  17,159
Jun-98  1,022  436  12  3,136  4,606  3,832  34  1,164  10,856  6,912  18,966  27,404
Dic-98  1,356  621  38  5,284  7,299  5,363  98  1,596  12,991  10,466 25,151  37,813
Jun-99  1,968  804  81  6,372  9,225  6,413  198  1,661  16,649  12,195 30,703  46,341
Dic-99  3,385  1,084  131  7,036  11,636  8,523  579  1,360 21,420  13,763 37,122  57,281
Note:  Retirees and  Survivors  may  receive  their  benefits  as:
- Frac:  Fractionary  withdrawal
-Sched:  Scheduled  withdrawal
-Ann:  Annuity
- N/D:  Not defined,  in most  cases  due  to delays  in processing  benefit  requests.
3TABLE IV
AVERAGE  FEES AS % OF INCOME,  INCLUDING  INSURANCE  COSTS.
AFJP  Dic-94  Jun-95  Dic-95  Jun-96  Dic-96  Jun-97  Dic-97  Jun-98  Dic-98  Jun-99  Dic-99
ACTIVA  3.61  3.61  3.60  - -
ACTIVA ANTICIPAR  3.55  3.55  3.53  3.53  3.54  - - - - -
AFIANZAR  3.88  3.76  3.72  3.46  3.49  3.47  3.45  3.45  - -
ARAUCA  BIT  3.40  3.40  3.29  3.29  3.28  3.11  2.94  2.85  2.82  2.79  2.78
CLARIDAD  3.55  3.82  3.73  3.74  3.83  3.79  3.74  3.74  - - -
CONSOLIDAR  3.30  3.30  3.30  3.30  3.30  3.30  3.30  3.30  3.30  3.30  3.30
DIGNITAS  3.83  - - - - - - - - -
ETHIKA  3.30  3.30  3.30  3.30  - - - - - -
JACARANDA  3.45  3.45  3.44  3.44  3.07  3.05  3.29  3,21  3.20  3.17
FECUNDA  3.71  3.71  3.69  3.69  3.50  3.48  3.48  - - -
FUTURA  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00
GENERAR  2.87  2.87  2.86  2.69  2.68  2.64  2.61  2.59  2.41  2.42  2.47
MAS VIDA  3.25  3.25  3.25  3.25  3.25  3.25  - - - -
MAXIMA  3.58  3.58  3.57  3.57  3.58  3.57  3.56  3.56  3.56  3.56  3.57
NACION  3.58  3.58  3.57  3.25  3.25  3.25  3.25  3.25  3.25  3.25  3.25
ORIGENES  3.62  3.62  3.59  3.59  3.60  3.57  3.56  3.55  3.56  3.55  3.55
PATRIMONIO  3.30  3.77  3.74  3.74  3.79  3.76  - - - -
PREVINTER  3.51  3.51  3.50  3.51  3.51  3.50  3.49  3.49  3.49  3.50  3.51
PREVISOL  3.44  3.44  3.56  3.57  3.58  3.56  3.55  3.55  3.55  3.56  3.58
PROFESI6N  + AUGE  3.50  3.50  3.49  3.50  3.51  3.20  3.20  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00
PRORENTA  3.50  3.50  3.50  3.50  3.50  3.50  3.50  3.50  3.50  3.50  3.50
SAN  JOSE  3.40  3.40  3.40  3.40  3.40  3.40  3.40  3.40  3.40  3.40
SAVIA  3.67  3.67  3.55  - - - -
SIEMBRA  3.73  3.74  3.72  3.73  3.74  3.72  3.71  3.71  3.71  3.70  3.71
UNIDOS  3.41  3.41  3.39  3.40  3.41  3.40  3.40  3.40  3.42  3.43  3.47
TOTAL  3.51  3.54  3.52  3.49  3.48  3.47  3.45  3.44  3.42  3.41  3.41
4TABLE V
ANNUAL RETURN OF PENSION FUNDS (in %)
dic-94  jun-95  dic-95  jun-96  dic-96  Jun-97  dic-97  jun-98  dic-98 AFJp  dlc-95  jun-96  dic-96  jun-97  dic-97  Jun-98  dic-98  Jun-99  dic-99
ACTIVA  14.95  - - - - - - - -
ACTIVA ANTICIPAR  21.16  20.89  20.09  - - -
AFIANZAR  16.95  21.43  14.94  15.77  10.08  0.64  - - -
ARAUCA  BIT  19.69  19.99  18.28  23.70  15.79  2.30  -0.40  4.58  15.37
CLARIDAD  17.68  20.46  19.36  22.00  10.44  -1.62  - - -
CONSOLIDAR  19.90  23.65  19.54  23.17  14.55  1.32  -0.25  6.20  17.93
ETHIKA  17.47  20.83  - - - - - - -
JACARANDA  19.32  20.30  19.79  22.01  12.92  - - - -
FECUNDA  23.73  19.42  18.51  23.31  10.83  - - - -
FUTURA  16.05  20.42  18.83  21.84  13.90  -0.24  -2.82  3.23  14.54
GENERAR  18.42  20.48  20.16  23.53  10.04  -1.64  -0.12  4.41  15.30
MAS  VIDA  19.20  17.43  19.36  21.12  - - - - -
MAXIMA  22.29  24.56  20.59  23.00  14.65  1.54  -1.52  4.28  15.24
NACION  16.37  19.22  18.76  21.86  15.58  2.93  -0.02  7.03  16.04
ORiGENES  20.99  23.55  20.68  24.73  16.57  1.95  -2.37  3.99  16.08
PATRIMONIO  14.67  18.35  15.63  18.76  - - - -
PREVINTER  21.50  22.81  18.56  23.95  15.80  0.71  -2.31  3.00  14.60
PREVISOL  19.39  22.02  20.46  24.30  15.09  0.50  -1.48  5.92  17.55
PROFESION  + AUGE  18.54  19.69  17.48  22.62  11.54  -1.59  -0.08  5.90  15.35
PRORENTA  23.21  25.66  20.31  21.82  14.74  1.66  -1.12  4.98  15.12
SAN  JOSt  15.73  22.93  19.39  21.86  13.43  1.74  0.21  6.08  -
SAVIA  14.20  - - - - - - -
SIEMBRA  18.72  23.51  20.78  24.57  15.75  0.81  -1.90  4.10  15.56
UNIDOS  17.94  25.66  21.49  20.22  9.90  -0.49  -2.04  2.83  14.77
AVERAGE  19.72  22.83  19.84  23.48  14.78  1.06  -1.47  4.52  15.98
MAXIMUM  25.64  29.68  25.79  30.52  19.21  3.06  0.53  6.52  20.77
MINIMUM  13.80  15.98  13.89  16.43  10.35  -0.94  -3.47  2.52  11.19
5TABLE VI
PENSION FUND ASSETS, IN MILLIONS OF US$
AFJP  Dic-94  Jun-94  Dic-95  Jun-95  Dic-96  Jun-96  Dic-97  Jun-97  Dic-98  Jun-98  Dic-99
ACTIVA  17,872  44,937  69,315  - - - -
ACTIVA ANTICIPAR  12,238  36,076  64,103  215,940  289,226  - - -
AFIANZAR  1,061  3,436  6,410  9,902  11,647  14,923  16,435  18,559  - - -
ARAUCA BIT  8,146  24,649  46,623  71,802  102,451  152,316  224,975  320,874  473,543  677,098  951,146
BANAT  5,433  329  329  329  329  329  - - - - -
CLARIDAD  24,520  56,317  94,377  133,144  158,512  192,624  194,481  217,505  - - -
CONSOLIDAR  80,936  214,813  404,936  621,534  887,193  1,235,057  1,456,576  1,922,404  2,199,652  2,631,003  3,196,565
DIGNITAS  9,948  - - - - - - - - - -
ETHIKA  97  735  1,877  3,210  - - - - -
JACARANDA  5,757  15,157  24,798  33,940  42,125  50,612  57,402  67,808  93,957  97,632
FECUNDA  13,690  35,061  67,248  113,887  158,297  215,990  246,912  - - -
FUTURA  11,039  31,407  56,099  86,065  113,241  154,067  176,991  194,641  206,118  240,536  278,145
GENERAR  13,053  34,276  63,845  101,480  153,995  239,400  337,823  415,366  451,708  573,770  787,328
MAS VIDA  1,114  4,632  12,085  23,815  34,462  39,399  - - - - -
MAXIMA  71,425  189,550  342,908  559,963  848,543  1,175,914  1,490,608  1,687,443  1,890,163  2,217,643  2,620,568
NACION  45,820  109,884  195,750  285,989  347,298  480,089  588,239  667,619  782,090  968,011  1,176,522
ORiGENES  34,861  104,294  220,111  356,931  496,482  1,048,210  1,338,749  1,540,573  1,983,486  2,377,841  2,862,844
PATRIMONIO  11,868  29,307  46,926  60,369  67,285  76,696  - - -
PREVINTER  38,250  114,660  236,566  380,254  553,307  792,537  917,923  1,031,155  1,125,828  1,291,718  1,454,770
PREVISOL  17,101  44,446  72,922  102,998  129,915  169,864  197,145  223,565  246,780  293,545  361,019
PROFESION  + AUGE  1,636  5,469  11,274  18,013  25,136  34,326  37,232  45,095  57,454  76,697  100,238
PRORENTA  13,638  32,705  49,908  72,759  99,357  133,263  151,517  169,423  212,278  260,368  377,768
SAN  JOSE  3,566  9,239  15,034  21,461  24,673  31,727  34,108  38,904  42,516  53,168  -
SAVIA  2,789  6,276  9,735  - - - - - -
SIEMBRA  75,709  208,594  368,725  541,651  750,760  1,065,464  1,311,485  1,484,450  1,696,791  2,023,646  2,522,503
UNIDOS  3.319  8.305  15,135  23,145  31,639  42,097  48,546  5f,f98  64,030  78,491  97,685
TOTAL  524,885  1,364,645  2,497,040  3,838,583  5,325,872  7,344,904  8,827,147  10,102,083  11,526,393  13,861,167  16,787,099
As % of GDP  0.20  0.52  0.97  1.46  1.96  2.60  3.01  3.38  3.87  4.75  5.85
6TABLE VIl
PORTFOLIO  STRUCTURE  OF PENSION  FUNDS  (in %)
TYPE OF ASSET  Dlc-94  Jun-95  DIc-95  Jun-96  Dlc-96  Jun-97  DIc-97  Jun-98  Dlc-98  Jun-99  Dic-99
CASH  6.33  2.27  1.68  2.24  1.83  1.38  0.98  1.37  1.52  1.92  0.97
Government Bonds  41.90  45.94  47.33  47.38  48.13  45.50  40.90  42.29  47.98  48.30  48.50
Local Government Bonds  7.93  5.53  5.35  4.41  4.57  3.76  2.46  2.33  2.01  2.99  3.80
Corporate Bonds  5.84  6.77  8.71  10.66  7.78  4.80  2.86  2.33  2.50  2.29  2.13
Certificates of Deposit  27.55  27.07  24.76  17.57  14.19  16.42  24.44  22.96  18.83  18.15  15.47
Stock  0.55  0.88  4.47  11.42  16.22  19.32  19.05  18.83  15.82  16.12  19.06
Stock of privatized companies  0.98  1.09  1.38  2.06  2.52  2.44  2.41  2.06  2.53  1.22  1.48
Mutual Funds  5.01  4.20  1.74  1.46  2.34  4.13  4.47  5.48  6.59  6.46  6.28
Foreign Government Bonds  0.08  1.35  0.44  0.22  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Foreign Private Assets  1.49  0.29  0.23  0.13  0.42  0.36  0.40  0.25  0.23  0.36
Regional Economies  3.82  3.40  3.85  2.32  1.73  1.36  1.49  1.40  1.42  1.56  1.41
Futures and Options  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.23  0.24
Direct Investment Funds  0.01  0.03  0.05  0.07  0.10  0.11  0.19  0.24  0.19
Mortgages  0.48  0.40  0.47  0.42  0.35  0.29  0.08
TOTAL  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00
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In a context  of a serious  financial  and  legal  crisis,  Argentina  reformed  its Pension
System  in 1994,  when  a multipillar  model  with a  funded  scheme  was  introduced  and
first  pillar parameters,  as  minimum  age  and  vesting  requirements  were  tightened.  The
new  system  has  a significant  first  pillar (which  offers  a flat benefit  currently  valued  at
28% of average  wage  to all retirees)  and  a second  pillar  that should  provide  a similar
amount,  once  the  transition  is  completed.
The  new  system  has  developed  rapidly  and  most  formal  workers  have  joined  the  new
funded  scheme.  However,  there  are  some  problems  that  must  be resolved.  In  the  first
pillar,  the  reform  balanced  long  term  finances,  but  it will also  reduce  coverage  very  rapidly,
as  a consequence  of  the  combined  effect  of low  formality  in the labor  market  and  stricter
contribution  requirements.  The  most  serious  problems  in  the  funded  pillar  are  the
administration  costs  and  the need  to improve  regulation  and  supervision  of insurance
companies,  that provide  disability  and  survivors  coverage  and  annuities  to beneficiaries.
While these  problems  are  important,  their  consequences  can  be avoided  if adequate
policies  are  developed  by  the  Government.  In  this  sense,  the  experience  of  the  pension
reform  in Argentina  is  an excellent  lesson  for other  countries  that are  considering  a
reform  in their  own systems.
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of pension  specialists  and  a vast  array  of cross-countty  evidence.  A flexible  and dynamic  format  ensure
that  key  developments-are  updated  as  they  occur.
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